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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
//1A-9/5/84 
GANANDA CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7089 
GANANDA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION. NEA/ 
NEW YORK. 
Charging Party. 
STANTON & VANDER BYL. ESQS. (WAYNE A. VANDER BYL. 
ESQ.. of Counsel), for Respondent 
WILLIAM R. SELL, for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The charge herein was filed by the Gananda Teachers 
Association, NEA/New York (Association) which represents the 
teachers and teaching assistants employed by the Gananda 
Central School District (District). It alleges that the 
District violated §209-a.l(a) and (d) of the Taylor Law by 
abolishing a past practice. The past practice, which has 
existed since September. 1975, permitted the children of 
nonresident, full-time employees of the District — not just 
teachers — to attend school at the District without payment of 
normal tuition charges. The matter comes to us on the 
exceptions of the Association to the decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing the charge. 
The ALJ found, and the record shows, that the practice was 
adopted by the District unilaterally in 1975, expanded by it 
_ Q9/f^ 
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unilaterally in a way that is not here material in 1978, and 
unilaterally subjected to a condition since 1980. That 
condition, which was noted on all letters approving 
applications for waiver of tuition since 1980, was that no 
future waivers of tuition would be granted if District 
residents complain about them. Finally, in August, 1983, the 
District unilaterally terminated its practice of waiving 
tuition — effective at the end of the 1983-84 school year — 
because there were such complaints. 
The Association argues that the ALJ erred in ruling that 
the District could have provided a benefit conditionally. It 
contends that the ALJ did not give sufficient weight to the 
language in Onondaga-Madison BOCES. 13 PERB 1P015 (1980). 
aff'd. BOCES v. PERB. 82 AD 2d 691. 14 PERB ir?025 (3d Dept.. 
1981). in which the Board said (at p. 3023) that "an employer 
may not unilaterally reserve to itself the right to change 
'policies' which involve mandatory subjects of negotiation." 
It further argues that even if the District could have 
unilaterally granted and then withdrawn a conditional benefit, 
the imposition of the condition and the withdrawal were 
improper. It asserts that the imposition of the condition was 
improper because the condition was not present when the waiver 
of tuition policy was adopted in 1975. It asserts that the 
withdrawal of the benefit was improper because the District did 
not give it official notification of the introduction of that 
condition. 
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The ALJ distinguished Onondaga-Madison BOCES on the ground 
that it dealt with an unarticulated reservation regarding the 
benefit it had granted while the condition imposed on the 
benefit granted herein was articulated in all letters approving 
tuition waivers since 1980. We affirm the reasoning of the ALJ. 
Although it contests the District's ability to set 
conditions on the use of the benefit unilaterally, elsewhere in 
its brief the Association appears to concede the validity of 
such a condition.— but it argues that the imposition must be 
set at the same time as the grant of the benefit. Assuming 
that there is such a limitation, the District might have 
committed an improper practice in 1980 when it imposed the 
condition, but not in 1983 when it acted on the condition, in 
which event the charge would not be timely. 
The ALJ rejected the Association's argument that the 
withdrawal of the benefit was improper because it had not been 
notified of the imposition of the condition on the grounds that 
past and present officers of the Association knew of the 
condition as they were among the employees receiving tuition 
waivers; he ruled that the information known by persons holding 
responsible offices in the Association must be imputed to the 
Association itself. We affirm this finding of fact and 
conclusion of law. 
i^It states in its brief to us: "If the policy had been 
adopted with the condition that no taxpayer complains about the 
practice, the Association would be precluded from arguing this 
case." 
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NOW. THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be. and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: September 5. 1984 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Wjtd^, 
David C. Randies. Membe. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
//1B-9/5/84 
In the Matter of 
SAUGERTIES CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT CASE NO. E-1015 
Upon the Application for Designation of 
Persons as Managerial or Confidential. 
WHITEMAN. OSTERMAN & HANNA, ESQS. (MELVIN H. 
OSTERMAN. JR., ESQ. of Counsel), for 
Saugerties Central School District 
JEFFREY R. CASSIDY. for Saugerties Federation of 
Employees 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Saugerties Federation of Employees (Federation) to a 
decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Director) designating Helen Ziegler 
and Amy Fabiano as confidential employees of the 
Saugerties Central School District (District) pursuant to 
§201.7(a) of the Taylor Law. 
Ziegler and Fabiano work as clerk typists for William 
Knaust. the District's business manager and treasurer, who 
has managerial responsibilities within the meaning of 
§201.7(a) of the Taylor Law by virtue of performing a 
major role in negotiations on behalf of the District. 
Ziegler's primary responsibilities involve the maintenance 
Board - E-1015 
of the general financial records of the District. 
Fabiano*s primary responsibilities involve keeping payroll 
and attendance records. Both, however, support one 
another. 
The record shows that Ziegler is privy to information 
— and indeed participates in the preparation of such 
information — which would show where the District has 
placed funds that are available for financing employee 
benefits that may be granted in collective negotiations. 
Fabiano has access to this information but does not appear 
to have any significant role in preparing it. She, on the 
other hand, has advance information of personnel changes, 
including layoffs, that are contemplated by the District. 
Both Ziegler and Fabiano prepare financial analyses of the 
impact of union negotiation demands and proposals that are 
being contemplated by the District. Giving an example of 
the effect of this, the Director notes that this 
assignment enabled them to know that the District was 
contemplating changing the carrier of its health insurance 
plan before such a possibility was presented to the 
Federation. 
It is on the basis of these facts that the Director 
issued the decision that both Ziegler and Fabiano act in a 
confidential capacity to Knaust. the decision to which the 
Federation has excepted. 
The Federation's first argument in support of its 
Board - E-1015 
exceptions is that the Director erred in holding that 
Ziegler's and Fabiano's knowledge of where the District 
has placed monies that are available for negotiation 
concessions is sufficient to make them confidential 
employees. We conclude, however, that the Director's 
holding is correct. The District is not required to share 
this information with the Federation as its disclosure 
would immediately inform the Federation as to what its' 
final offer might be. 
The Federation argues that, even without disclosure 
of the information, by a careful analysis of the 
District's budget, it could discover where, and how much, 
money has been set aside for negotiation concessions. 
This may be true, but the process would be difficult and 
time consuming, and the results would not likely be 
available for the commencement of negotiations; in any 
event, the Federation is not entitled to have the work 
done for it by the District. 
The Federation's second argument is that the extent 
to which Ziegler and Fabiano are used to compute the cost 
of negotiation proposals is not sufficient for their 
designation as confidential employees. 
A iins Ox. uistinction was urawn uy tue Director in 
Washingtonville CSD, 15 PERB ir4081 (1982). There, he 
found Weinheim. a bookkeeper, to be confidential because 
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she was called upon "to cost out the District's salary and 
benefits proposals, both actual and potential. . .[making] 
her well aware of the District's likely negotiating 
strategem . . . ." On the other hand, he found Himelson, 
a payroll clerk, and Mogge. an account clerk, not to be 
confidential because, while they "validate figures 
presented by the unions during negotiations . . . [and] 
compile statistical information for the District's use in 
negotiations . . . 'they are not involved in the 
extrapolation of this raw material for labor relations 
purposes.'"(citation omitted)— 
The Federation asserts that the work assigned to 
Ziegler and Fabiano is comparable to the work assigned to 
Himelson and Mogge. The District asserts that the work 
assigned to Ziegler and Fabiano is comparable to the work 
assigned to Weinheim. We agree with the District. 
The Federation's third argument is that the Director 
erred in determining that Ziegler's and Fabiano's 
awareness of contemplated changes in a health insurance 
carrier was a sufficient basis for declaring them 
confidential. The health insurance incident was given by 
the Director as an example of the kind of information to 
i^We affirmed the Director's decision with respect to 
Himelson and Mogge. 16 PERB lf3017 (1982). His decision 
regarding Weinheim did not come to us. 
Q9 
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which Ziegler and Fabiano are privy; it was not intended 
to stand alone as a justification for their designation as 
confidential. In any event, the Federation argues that it 
was public knowledge that health insurance costs had grown 
substantially and were troubling the District. While this 
is true, the Federation did not know, while Ziegler and 
Fabiano did. what the District was contemplating doing 
about the matter, and the District had a right to keep 
this information confidential. 
Finally, the Federation argues that Ziegler's and, 
more particularly, Fabiano's advance knowledge of 
contemplated personnel changes is insufficient for their 
) designation as confidential. We reject this argument. 
The mere contemplation of layoffs, employee reassignments 
and other personnel changes may have a significant impact 
upon the labor relations of a public employer. Moreover, 
while there are times when a public employer should 
discuss its plans with the unions representing its 
employees, often it need not do so. Such information is 
often confidential. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the 
arguments of the parties, we affirm the decision of the 
Director. 
•7r 5j/S^Do 
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NOW, THEREFORE. WE ORDER that Helen Ziegler and Amy 
Fabiano be, and they hereby are, 
designated confidential employees of 
the Saugerties Central School District, 
DATED: September 5, 19 84 
Albany, New York 
'&>&7<^cz<7< ^y 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
David C. Randies. Member 
P^ 1 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 





RUDOLPH P. RUSSO, ESQ.. for Respondent 
RICHARD B. WOLF. ESQ.. for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The charge herein was filed by Francine Rosen against 
the Dutchess Community College (College). It alleges that 
the College violated §209-a.1(a). (b) and (c) of the Taylor 
Law in that it reduced her course load because she engaged in 
protected activities in seeking to improve the terms and 
conditions of employment of fellow teachers at the College's 
French School.-
1/The French School is operated by the College 
pursuant to a contract with IBM Corp. to provide elementary 
and secondary education to the dependent children of IBM 
France employees who have been assigned to work for IBM in 
Poughkeepsie. New York. The educational program is 
designed to satisfy the reguirements of the French Ministry 
of Education. 
The faculty of the College proper is organized and 
is represented by the Dutchess United Teachers. The 
faculty of the French School is not organized. 
#lC-9/5/84 
CASE NO. U-6602 
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The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the (b) 
allegation on the ground that there is no evidence that the 
College knew that the French School faculty was trying to 
2/ 
organize.— A fortiori it did not try to dominate any 
union or interfere with its formation. He found a possible 
basis for the (a) and (c) allegations in that Rosen had 
complained to the College leadership about terms and 
conditions of employment at the French School and, speaking 
on behalf of some fellow teachers, she had sought to improve 
them. However, he determined that there was merit in the 
College's defense that it would have cut Rosen's classes in 
any event because it did not wish to afford her full-time 
status, and she claimed such status on the ground that her 
hours of employment exceeded 15 a week each semester. 
Rosen's hours had been split between the College proper 
(7-8 hours a week each semester) and the French School (15-16 
hours a week each semester), and the College had informed her 
that it viewed these as two separate jobs. The College 
argued that it cut Rosen's hours because she disputed this 
view and repeatedly asserted that the hours she taught at 
each school should be added together. 
i-/The ALJ had previously dismissed the charge on the 
ground that we lack jurisdiction over the French School 
because it is not a public employer. We reversed this 
decision (17 PERB 1f30l0 [1984]) and remanded the matter to 
the ALJ for a decision on the merits. 
Board - U-6602 -3 
This matter now comes to the Board on Rosen's exception to 
the ALJ's conclusion that the College has shown that it would 
have cut her hours regardless of her complaints about the 
terms and conditions of employment of teachers at the French 
School. 
Having reviewed the evidence, we find merit in this 
exception. The record shows that by the terms of the 
College's collective bargaining agreement with the Dutchess 
United Teachers, which covers the faculty of the College 
proper, full-time teachers include those who work 30 hours 
per week each year or 15 hours each semester, and perform 
some additional nonteaching duties. Rosen's claim of 
full-time status is based upon her contention that the hours 
of her two teaching assignments, when added together, 
amounted to 24 hours a week. The College's response was that 
the hours cannot be added as the two types of teaching 
assignments are of a different character and the hours of 
teaching criterion contemplates teaching time at the College 
proper only. Nevertheless, the College asserts, when Rosen 
kept on reiterating her claim, it cut her teaching time at 
the College in half in order to foreclose any possible claim. 
We reject this assertion. It is inconsistent with the 
fact that Rosen was permitted to teach well over 15 hours per 
semester for the combined programs even after the cut. 
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Having rejected the College's explanation of its 
reduction of Rosen's hours, we find that it reduced them at 
least in part because Rosen complained about the terms and 
conditions of employment of teachers at the French School. 
Moreover, the record shows that Rosen's complaints were made 
with the knowledge and consent of some of the teachers at the 
French School after they had discussed their concerns among 
themselves. However, there is no indication in the record 
that the teachers were seeking to form an employee 
organization or to be represented by such an organization. 
On these facts, we conclude that the College's conduct 
did not constitute an improper practice under the Taylor 
Law. The relevant provisions of §209-a.l provide that it is 
an improper practice for a public employer to interfere with, 
restrain or coerce public employees or to discriminate 
against them because they seek to form, join or participate 
in an employee organization of their own choosing. It does 
so by cross-referencing to §202 of the Taylor Law which 
provides: 
Public employees shall have the right to 
form, join and participate in, or to 
refrain from forming, joining, or 
participating in, any employee organization 
of their own choosing. 
Inasmuch as the record does not show that Rosen or other 
teachers of the French School were attempting to assert 
§202 rights, we cannot find that the College's actions were 
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designed to frustrate those rights. 
Rosen argues that the informal meeting of teachers to 
discuss concerns, and Rosen's articulation of those 
concerns to the College on behalf of the group, constitute 
an assertion of §202 rights. In support of this 
proposition, she cites judicial interpretations of §7 of 
the National Labor Relations Act and contends that these 
interpretations are applicable to §202 of the Taylor Law as 
well. 
We reject this argument. In pertinent part, §7 of the 
National Labor Relations Act provides:-
Employees shall have the right to 
self-organization, to form, join, or assist 
labor organizations, to bargain 
collectively through representatives of 
their own choosing, and to engage in other 
concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining or other mutual aid 
or protection . . . . (emphasis supplied) 
Many provisions of the National Labor Relations Act 
were incorporated into the Taylor Law by the State 
Legislature. Indeed, the first part of §7 was included, 
almost in. haec verba, in §202 of the Taylor Law. We 
therefore conclude that the omission of language comparable 
to the second part of §7 evidences an intention not to 
afford protection to the concerted activities of employees 
that fall short of an attempt to form, join, participate in 
or refrain from forming, joining or participating in an 
is" 
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employee organization.— This conclusion is strengthened 
by a comparison of the Taylor Law definition of employee 
organization with the NLRA definition of labor 
4/ 
organization.— The Taylor Law definition covers only 
actual organizations while the broader NLRA definition also 
covers representation committees and plans. 
Finding that the Taylor Law does not protect the 
conduct engaged in by Rosen, we dismiss this charge. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be. 
and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: September 5, 1984 
Albany, New York 
1/See City of New York. 9 PERB 1f3047 (1976). 
4/Section 201.5 of the Taylor Law provides: 
The term "employee organization" means an 
organization of any kind having as its primary 
purpose the improvement of terms and conditions of 
employment of public employees . . . . 
Section 2(5) of the NLRA provides: 
The term "labor organization" means any 
organization of any kind, or any agency or 
employee representation committee or plan, in 
which employees participate and which exists for 
the purpose in whole or in part, of dealing with 
employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, 
wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or 
conditions of work. 
Q9f> 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TONAWANDA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Respondent, 
-and-
TONAWANDA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION. 
NYSUT/AFT. AFL-CIO. #3056. 
Charging Party. 
JOHN J. PONTERIO. ESQ. for Respondent 
ROBERT J. JUREWICZ, for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Tonawanda City School District (District) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that it improperly transferred 
unit work to nonunit employees, and that it refused to 
negotiate the impact of the transfer. The charge, filed by 
Tonawanda Educaton Association, NYSUT/AFT. AFL-CIO. #3056 
(Association), alleges that the District unilaterally 
eliminated two of four nurse/teacher (unit) positions, laying 
off two nurse/teachers while creating nurse (nonunit) 
positions and appointing five such nurses. The Association 
further alleges that it demanded that the District negotiate, 
among other things, the layoff of two nurse/teachers and the 
impact of the transfer of unit work to nonunit employees on 
the terms and conditions of employment of unit employees. 
//1D-9/5/84 
CASE NO. U-7187 
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The ALJ found merit in the charge and ordered the 
District: 1) to restore the jobs of the laid off 
nurse/teachers and to make them whole; 2) to cease and desist 
from the assignment of unit work to nonunit employees; 3) to 
negotiate the impact of its decision to abolish nurse/teacher 
positions; and 4) to post an appropriate notice. 
The District argues that the ALJ erred in finding that 
it violated its duty to negotiate the impact of the change of 
employee assignments in that the Association had made no 
demand to negotiate impact but only to negotiate the change 
itself, and that the change took place in mid-contract term 
and the Association had waived its right to all mid-term 
negotiations, including impact negotiations. We affirm this 
part of the ALJ's decision. The language of the Associaton's 
negotiation proposal clearly demands negotiations regarding 
the impact of the change. There were, of course, no specific 
impact proposals but. as noted by the ALJ, the District 
denied the demand without asking for or awaiting specific 
proposals. We also find no merit in the District's waiver 
argument. The contract provision cited by the District 
contains two paragraphs. The first precludes mid-term 
negotiations regarding any matter covered by the parties 
collective bargaining agreement. For matters not covered by 
the agreement — and the agreement does not deal with the 
impact of unilateral changes — it precludes mid-term 
negotiations "except in cases as reguired by applicable 
Board - U-7187 -3 
law." Absent a clear waiver, such impact negotiations are 
required by the Taylor Law.— 
The District next argues that the ALJ erred in finding 
that the jobs of the nurse/teachers and of the nurses were 
substantially the same, which was the basis of her conclusion 
2/ that the nurses were given unit work.— 
In considering whether the District assigned the unit work 
of nurse/teachers to nurses, we note the position of the 
District that the nurse/teachers' work is divided into three 
categories: 1) classroom teaching; 2) "other teaching" which, 
according to a District witness, consists of "any instruction 
given by the school nurse-teacher to groups of two or more 
students, teachers, administrators or parents"; and 3) 
one-to-one teaching, also referred to as "health counseling". 
It is conceded by the Association that the nurses have not 
engaged in classroom teaching, such work being limited to 
nurse/teachers. The record shows, however, that, 
notwithstanding job descriptions which limited "other teaching" 
and "health counseling" to nurse/teachers, such work was 
performed by nurses as well. The District's own witnesses and 
1/citv of Watertown. 10 PERB VSQOS (1977), 
-^/Related to this argument, the District contends 
that the ALJ erred in not granting its motions to dismiss 
the charge after a presentation of the Association's 
evidence and after the hearing was completed. 
Q9fi 
• Vjj" <**r lr^ \J* 
Board - U-7187 
-4 
its documentary evidence establish that it considered such 
work to be reserved exclusively for nurse/teachers. 
Accordingly, we find it to be unit work, the assignment of 
4/ 
which to nonunit employees violates the Taylor Law.— 
5/ Finally,— the District argues that the ALJ erred in 
ruling that it had failed to show that the transfer of the 
unit work was motivated by a compelling need related to the 
performance of its mission. It asserts that the test applied 
by the ALJ is an inappropriate one, it being sufficient that 
the change relates to the level of services that it chooses 
to provide to its constituency. Thus, according to the 
District, evidence of a compelling need is irrelevant. 
i/Northport UFSD. 9 PERB 1P003 (1976). Cf. East 
Ramapo CSD. 10 PERB 1f3064 (1977). There, we dismissed an 
improper practice charge because the functions assigned to 
the nonunit position "were merely incidental to the 
primary, but eliminated, work "of the unit position", (at 
p. 3113). 
Also. Cf. North Shore UFSD. 11 PERB 1f3011 (1978). 
There, we found no violation when the District abolished 
the unit position of nurse/teacher and assigned the duties 
performed by the nurse/teachers — except for classroom 
teaching — to a newly created position of nurse. We made 
no finding there, as we do here, that other assignments 
given to the nurses had constituted unit work. 
•5/The District also argues that, insofar as the 
charge complained about the creation of the nurse 
position, the ALJ erred in not dismissing it as being 
untimely, the position having been created more than four 
months before the charge was filed. This argument is 
irrelevant The ALJ did not find a violation by reason of 
the District's creation of the new position. Rather, she 
found that the transfer of unit work to that position was 
improper. 
264 
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This argument has no bearing upon the basis of our 
decision. There is no indication in the record that the 
District has curtailed any service to its constituency. 
Whatever classroom teaching was done in the past by the four 
nurse/teachers could have been and was probably absorbed by 
the remaining two. There was also no showing of any 
diminution of "other teaching" or "health counseling". Part 
of this unit work was merely assigned to nonunit employees. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER the District to: 
1. Offer to reinstate the two laid off 
school nurse/teachers under their prior 
terms and conditions of employment and 
make them whole for any loss of wages 
or benefits sustained as the result of 
their termination, with interest at the 
legal rate; 
2. Negotiate in good faith with the 
Association, upon demand, the impact of 
its decision to abolish the school 
nurse/teacher positions. 
3. Cease and desist from the assignment of 
unit work to nonunit employees. 
Q9^ 
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4. Post the attached notice at all places 
normally used to communicate with unit 
employees. 
DATED: September 5. 19 84 
Albany. New York 
Z^M^^y 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
6UAJ,<4^J h 
David C. Randies. Member 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify employees within the unit represented by the Tonawanda Education 
Association, NYSUT/AFT/AFL-CIO, #3056, that the Tonawanda :City School District 
will: 
1. Offer to reinstate the two laid off school nurse/teachers 
under their prior terms and conditions of employment and make 
them whole for any loss of wages or benefits sustained as the 
result of their termination, with interest at the legal rate. 
2. Negotiate in good faith with the Association, upon demand, 
the impact of its decision to abolish the school nurse/teacher 
positions. 
3. Not assign unit work to nonunit employees. 
Tonawanda City School District 
Dated By (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. Qif}t 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#lE-9/5 /84 I n t h e M a t t e r o f 
TOWN OF DRESDEN. 
R e s p o n d e n t , 
- a n d - CASE NO. U-73 83 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 294. affiliated with 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS. 
CHAUFFEURS. WAREHOUSEMEN. AND HELPERS 
OF AMERICA. 
Charging Party. 
WILLIAM L. NIKAS. ESQ, for Respondent 
POZEFSKY, POZEFSKY & BRAMLEY. ESQS. (BRUCE C. BRAMLEY. 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to the Board on the exceptions of the 
Town of Dresden to the decision of the Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) determining that the Town violated Section 
209-a.l(d) of the Act when the Town Supervisor failed to 
execute a collective bargaining agreement after having agreed 
to the terms contained therein. The ALJ sustained the charge 
filed by Teamsters Local 294 (Union) and directed the Town 
Supervisor to execute the contract submitted by the Union for 
ratification in January of 1984 (Union Exhibit 7). 
^y^sH 
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The Town's position at the hearing and in its exceptions 
is that the Supervisor lacked authority to reach final 
agreement without its prior ratification by the Town Board. 
The ALJ determined that any limitation on the authority of 
the Supervisor to negotiate and agree was not clearly 
communicated to the Union. In its exceptions the Town 
asserts that the Supervisor did not have authority to bind 
the Town Board and that the Union representative was aware 
that the Town Board reserved the right to approve the 
contract. While it is conceded that no explicit 
communication to that effect was given, the Town asserts that 
the evidence establishes that it was clear enough that the 
negotiations were conducted with the "ground rule" that the 
Town Board reserved the right to ratify the agreement. 
FACTS 
The Union was certified as the representative of the 
highway department employees of the Town on January 28. 
1983. It demanded negotiations but none were held until July 
29, 1983, at which time the Union negotiator. Campbell, met 
with the Town Attorney, Nikas, to discuss a proposed draft 
contract submitted by Campbell. Sometime in October. 1983. 
P a w r v K A l 1 -m ^\ +• x.tA +• V* +• V* c» T A T . I W C n r v A v t r i r* r\ v TD r\ +• a f~* a Tnrnr\ V\ c* "\ 1 
\^&.lU}-> iJSZ M A. 1 I 1 C U W J. U1JL V-1A<= J. IS W J. J. U U J J C J . V X g U l , J . V V / L . V I * Vrf (_* All j - * J . / \ S J . J . 
testified that at that meeting he and Rota reviewed the 
issues still outstanding, and that Rota agreed that Nikas 
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would finalize the contract, draw it up, and Rota would sign 
it. Rota testified that at the end of this meeting with 
Campbell, he said that he will "take this back to the Board 
and see what the Board feels about it." 
On January 11. 1984. Nikas mailed Campbell a contract 
which was a revision of the original union contract, 
including a substantially different wage schedule. The 
letter accompanying this contact indicated Rota's position 
with regard to wages. The letter offers two alternative 
compromises. Campbell testified that he spoke to Nikas on 
the phone about the wage issue and then took the matter to 
the employees who ratified one of the alternatives. Campbell 
returned the contract to Nikas for Rota's signature. 
On February 7. 1984, Nikas returned the contract to 
Campbell unsigned and with many changes. In his letter he 
states that a "majority vote" could not be. obtained "without 
various amendments." It appears that after the January 
contract was mailed to Campbell, Rota met with the Town Board. 
DISCUSSION 
The exceptions filed on behalf of the Town indicate a 
misunderstanding of the respective legal responsibilities of 
the chief executive officer and the legislative body of a 
public employer regarding negotiations under the Taylor Law. 
The chief executive officer—in this case, the Supervisor—is 
... Q970' 
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responsible for representing the municipality in negotiating 
contracts. The Act contemplates that negotiations will be an 
executive, not a legislative, process (§§201.12, 204-a; City 
of Kingston v. PERB. 16 PERB T7002 (Sup. Ct.. Alb. Co. 1983); 
see CSEA v. Helsbv. 21 NY2d 541, 547. 1 PERB T702. at p. 7008 
[1968]). The Act specifically defines an agreement as an 
exchange of mutual promises between the chief executive 
officer and an employee organization "which becomes a binding 
contract" except as to any provisions which require approval 
by the legislative body (§§201.12. 204-a). 
There is an important difference between the legislative 
body's statutory responsibility to review an executed 
agreement and the power to "ratify" the entire agreement 
prior to execution. We have previously held that a 
legislative body may not unilaterally reserve to itself the 
authority to ratify the entire agreement (Falconer Central 
School District. 6 PERB 1P029 [1973]; Jamestown Teachers 
Association, 6 PERB ir3075 [1973]). On the other hand, we 
have recognized the right of the parties to agree that their 
negotiations will be subject to the right of the legislative 
body to ratify the entire agreement (Glen Cove City School 
District. 6 PERB V3004 [1973]). Where the legislative body 
directly assumes negotiation responsibilitv with the 
acquiescence of the chief executive officer and the employee 
organization and holds itself out as having the authority to 
negotiate an agreement, its promises will be binding on the 
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public employer. The members of the legislative body that 
negotiated the agreement may not repudiate it by claiming a 
different capacity as legislators (Sylvan-Verona Beach Common 
School District. 15 PERB 1f3067 [1982]). 
As to those aspects of an agreement reguiring 
legislative approval, there is no requirement that the 
parties be aware of any reservation of right on the part of 
the legislative body. Such right inheres in the legislative 
body by virtue of the statute. As to other matters, the 
chief executive officer is clothed by the statute with 
authority to bind the public employer. If the chief 
executive officer and the legislative body agree that the 
legislative body will be responsible for the negotiation 
process, then it is essential that the employee organization 
agree beforehand to such a fundamental "ground rule." While 
such agreement may conceivably be evidenced by a course of 
conduct, it must be clear that the employee organization was 
made fully and explicitly aware of such "ground rule" and 
acquiesced in it. 
The evidence in this record does not support a finding 
that the Union agreed to any such ground rule. Neither the 
Supervisor nor the Town Attorney testified to any explicit 
statement that the Town Board would participate in the 
negotiation process, as distinguished from its statutory role 
to review an executed agreement. Consequently, the Union 
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representative could properly believe that negotiations would 
take place on the basis of the respective statutory 
responsibilities of the Supervisor and the Town Board. 
One other issue remains for consideration. That is 
whether the Supervisor reached a "meeting of the minds" with 
the Union representative regarding the contract. Having 
reviewed the record, we conclude that the evidence supports 
the finding that Campbell and Rota reached an agreement at 
their meeting in October, which agreement was evidenced by 
the contract sent to Campbell on January 11, 1984. It would 
appear that the only issue raised by Rota at this point 
involved wages. Nikas' letter of that date can properly be 
construed as a counteroffer which was subsequently accepted 
by the Union membership. We conclude, therefore, that an 
agreement was reached between the chief executive officer and 
the employee organization. 
CONCLUSION 
We find that the Town violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act by 
reason of the Town Supervisor's refusal to execute the 
contract. 
ACCORDINGLY, WE ORDER that: 
1. The Town Supervisor execute the 
contract submitted by the union for 
ratification in January of 1984 (Union 
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Exhibit 1)'.-' 
2. The Town of Dresden negotiate in good 
faith with Teamsters Local 294 concerning 
terms and conditions of employment for 
employees represented by said Union; and 
3. The Town of Dresden post the attached 
notice at all locations normally used for 
communications to unit employees. 
DATED: September 5. 19 84 
Albany. New York 
^^^^^V^/^^6^^«fc 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
Ly.^& 
David C. Randies, Member 
i^This order does not foreclose the Town Board from 
the exercise of its proper legislative function insofar as 
it relates to those matters reguiring. by statute, 
legislative approval before they may be binding upon the 
Town. (§§201.12. 204-a) 
APPENDIX 
E TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Teamsters 
Local 294, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America, that the Town of 
Dresden will: 
1. By its Town Supervisor, execute the contract agreed 
to by the Town Supervisor and submitted to the Union 
for ratification in January of 1984; and 
2. Negotiate in good faith with the Teamsters Local 2 94, 
concerning the terms and conditions of employment for 
employees represented by the Union. 
Town of Dresden 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
m 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
//1F-9/5/84 In the Matter of 
BEACON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7030 
BEACON TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, NEA/NY. 
Charging Party. 
THOMAS HALLEY. ESQ.. for Respondent 
JOSEPH DiVINCENZO. for charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to the Board on the exceptions of the 
Beacon Teachers Association, NEA/NY (Association) to the 
decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its 
charge against the Beacon City School District (District). 
The Association's charge alleges that the District violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Act by unilaterally increasing the length 
of the 1982-83 work year by one day to 182 actual teacher 
work days. 
The ALJ found that the District's promulgated school 
calendar for the year in question and the prior four years 
contained either 185 or 183 teacher work days, and that the 
teachers actually worked 180 days in 1979-80 and 1981-82 and 
181 days in 1980-81. The ALJ further found that any 
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difference between the promulgated calendar work days and the 
days actually worked was the result of "emergency days" when 
the District closed the schools due to inclement weather or 
other unusual circumstances. The ALJ found no evidence that 
the 182 days the teachers actually worked in 1982-83 resulted 
from any change in that practice. 
In its exceptions, the Association asserts that the 
evidence supports the conclusion that the practice of the 
District had been to limit the actual work days to no more 
than 181 days and that the District unilaterally added one 
day to the work year in the 1982-83 school year. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the 
contentions of the Association, we affirm the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law of the ALJ. 
ACCORDINGLY, WE ORDER that the charge herein be. and it 
hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: September 5. 1984 
Albany. New York 
^ ^ a e ^ ^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 






CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Greenville Custodian-Drivers 
Association. NYSUT has been designated and selected by a majority 
of the employees of the above named employer, in the unit 
described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Custodian, Cleaner, Mechanic, Head 
Mechanic. Custodial Repairman. 
Cleaner/Monitor and Bus Driver. 
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Excluded: Assistant Buildings and Grounds 
Supervisor. Transportation Supervisor 
and other employees. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Greenville Custodian-
Drivers Association. NYSUT and enter into a written agreement 
with such employee organization with regard to terms and 
conditions of employment of the employees in the unit found 
appropriate, and shall negotiate collectively with such employee 
organization in the determination of, and administration of, 
grievances of such employees. 
DATED: September 5. 1984 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
WVt/<3-^ 
David C. Rand 
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